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The BAROMETER is a student newspaper for the exchange of ideas and 
information concerning the development and improvement of the 
professional environment at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
*+*+*+*+*+*+*+*+* 
It is an amiable and common conceit that one's own behavior is 
better than that of one's opponent, and it may even be true upon 
occasion. What is absured is that we should expect an enemy to base 
its military policy on our own estimate of our own moral character." 
P.M.S. Blacket, "A Critique of Defece Thinking," ENCOUNTER, April 1961 
as reprinted from the NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, January-February 1974 
EDITORIAL COMMENT: "Both the United States and the Soviet Union face the world, and there-
fore each other, strong in the belief that they possess a monopoly on righteousness. Each 
feels the power of moral imperative. Similarly, each seeks to resolve problems in terms of 
its own limited philosophy. In any given crisis the superpowers are likely to possess 
the same empirical data but, because of intuitive, culturally determined factors, arrive 
at different estimations of the situation. If this inability to correctly preceive the 
intent or objectives of one's opponent is attached to the question of: When will the 
other side fire? the problem becomes serious indeed." (Taken from lead-in of FEATURE) 
FEATURE: CRISIS MENTALITY: A PROBLEM IN CULTURAL RELATIVITY by CAPT Robert B. Bathurst, USN 
"I.n reaction to any perceived crisis in U.S. security, the currently ~st favored ~<iftern 
of action is, whenever possible, to send an aircraft carrier to the vici~ ot-the . 
distrubance. In turn, the Soviet reaction tends to come in the form of J:m~ss~e cruiser 11"- < 
stationed within range of our aircraft carrier. While these have becomet8r~ce~t8~ and 
perhaps conditioned responses, such calm acceptance of military reality ~~~not ,always the 
case. When the Soviet naval buildup in the Eastern Mediterranean foced ne~ta~ica1 
realities upon us in the Jordan crisis in 1970, we had no planned react~~ ~ave since 
learned to expect Soviet missile tubes trained on our ships nearly anywhere in the wQrld 
where the state interests of one or the other power are sufficiently involved. Inevitably, 
our initiative in foreign affairs is affected by that expectation, and our tacticians 
have had to adjust their plans accordingly. 
The question which repeatedly presents itself is: Under what circumstances might one 
of the adversaries fire? A review of recent history suggests that U.S. analysts have a 
distrubing probability of arriving at the wrong answer. 
Perhaps the two most flagrant examples of this miscalaulation are invasions having 
taken place to our almost total surprise: into Czechoslovakia in 1968 and into the Sinai 
in 1973. We have b~en through a sobering lesson in the reevaluation of the Soviet 
interpretation of detente brought about by the planning, supply, and diplomatic support 
given the Arab attack against Israel. Indeed, the history of our calculations about the 
missions and functions of the Soviet Navy since the 1950's, and thus its likely weapons 
program, now seems very limited and naive. 
What we have witnessed is the skillful application of cover and deception, conditioning, 
and very long-range integrated planning. Furthermore, the scale of its application suggests 
that these have not been localized military demonstrations of tactical principles, the 
issue, as some would have it, of service jockeying for funds and missions. Rather they 
were the result of state plans and policy requiring high-level support and cooperation. 
As the Israelis learned, although they hardly needed the lesson, in modern war you do 
not get ready. You have to be ready. That two large-scale invasions could take place 
without advance warning, in spite of the extraordinary sophistication of means of surveill-
ance, should sober and frighten every political and military leader as nothing since World 
War II has done. If one attempts to put this in the proper perspective with a review of 
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Soviet military literature which emphasizes that the outcome of a successful battle under 
modern conditions will be heavily influenced by surprise and readiness, one concludes that 
both invasions were successful applications of widely held doctrine. 
The speed of modern warfare, the destructiveness, and the equilibrium in the balance of 
power force us to concentrate on intentions and therefore the gray world of psychology. 
The contest between an aircraft carrier and a missile cruiser, a submarine and a destroyer, 
and, ultimately, one ICBM system and another is likely to be decided by the question of 
who fires first. The speed of missiles permits no time for succeeding stages of readiness 
or for the analytical development of countertactics on the battlefield or at sea. The 
timing in the contest between an Egyptian Styx missile and an Israeli Gabriel is a matter 
of miliseconds. 
The problem in predicting intentions-a problem that all political and military leaders 
in the superpowers cannot now avoid-is that the application of rational faculties alone will 
not give us the correct answer. In fact, dependence on a purely rational analysis devoid 
of any appreciation for cultural relativity seems to promote an arrogance that leads to 
disastrously wrong answers. The problem in discussing these psychological and emotional 
elements, however, is that they are not subject to precision or quantification. Yet, serious 
decisions, possibly cataclysmic decisions, are and will be made on the basis of them. 
The role of intuition and inner conviction in making decisions certainly needs to be 
explored. The problem is serious. After the leader is given the briefings and computer 
read-outs, he has to answer "will they" or "won't they". That decision will probably be 
made on the basis of what in America would be called a "gut reaction". Those who make 
decisions on a high level have, quite rightly, developed a faith in their "gut reactions". 
They think-and empirical evidence appears to support this-that they have achieved positions 
of power over their equally qualified colleagues on the basis of generally correct intuition. 
However, a problem develops when these decisionmakers-who have risen to their positions on 
the basis of actions taken within the context of their own culture-are suddenly faced with 
intercultural problems. It is then that their "gut reactions" are likely to arrive at a 
faulty conclusion through the inadequate digestion of data available. 
When the Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, returned from Moscow where he had success-
fully negotiated a cease-fire in the Middle East, he spoke of the historic responsibility 
of both powers to preserve peace. Both powers certainly recognize such a responsibility, 
but the kind of actions which each side feel are necessary to fulfill that responsibility, 
and thus the point at which one or the other might "squeeze the trigger", are often very 
different indeed. Let us examine them. 
Contrary to American practice, the Soviets refer their decisions to the authority of a 
deterministic philosophy. In their interpretation of the historical process, the dialectic 
has established that the world proletariat will resolve all class conflicts. The Soviet 
Government, firmly controlled by the Communist Party, sees itself as the prime defender and 
interpreter of that historical process. Indeed, the very legitimacy of Soviet leaders is 
derived from their ability to make correct and loyal Marxist-Leninist deductions. They 
therefore experience the weight of a moral and historical imperative. No one can propose 
policy, write reports, present briefings, or even interpret events without reference to that 
general philosophy. 
In their view, imperialists, lead by the United States, are obstructing the process of 
history-an unjustified and, in the end, hopeless undertaking. There is, therefore, a moral 
obligation to generations unborn to block this regressive policy and to advance the 
historical process. In fulfilling the exalted dictates of history, all methods are justified-
morality is a cultural and class concept, not a historical one. In addition to the usual 
military and diplomatic tactics, blackmail and deceit are useful and justified. Force is ~ 
obviously necessary and inevitable. History has, with the Soviet Union, already justified 
the liquidation of whole classes and nationalities. Would it show mercy during the liquid-
ation of regressive nations? 
These feelings, in a broader sense, have not been created by Marxism alone but are 
equally derived from and are culturally reinforced by the strong romantic, religious, and 
national sentiments toward the role of "Holy" Russia in preserving a kind of "purity" and 
finding the way for the salvation of mankind. 
The United States, too, sees iteself as the servant of history by protecting the rights 
of free peoples to determine their own destiny. We too have a moral obligation to all man-
kind. Therefore, as Henry Kissinger pointed out, while we recognize our responsibility to 
maintain peace, there is a point at which we would be obliged to fire in a confrontation 
with the Soviets. 
That "point" marks, of course, the future Armageddon. How can it be defined precisely? 
It is not a rational or mathematical measurement. It will not be decided by democratic 
processes. Yet, from the general acceptance of at least the reality of that point, it seems 
to embody a concept about which there is a kind of consensus. 
~" ... .. 
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The Soviet and American ways of looking at the world have at least one similarity-a 
historical, Messianic vision. In each case the vision provides a moral justification for 
violence, and in each case it provides guides to action which are in with the dictates of 
the opposing system. Under these circumstances d~tente can never be more than a temporary 
tactic for either side. 
The Soviet Government is quite emphatic about its philosophical system and its view of 
events in terms of their contribution to the fulfillmment of a preordained order. Having 
such a view of reality, the Soviet Government operates with considerable consistency. How 
then do we conclude that "this year" the Soviets will not invate Czechoslovakia? 
Our difficulty in understanding the dictates of so all-encompassing an ideology is 
deep seated, at least among naval officers. Each visit by a head of state, each evidence 
of cooperation on some cultural or economic level lends itself to the desired interpretation 
~hat now we will be friends. Obviously there is a temptation to conclude that the individual, 
temporal manifestation of understanding proves the invalidity of the domination of ideology. 
This recurring need to ignore or translate this hostile philosophy into a comfortable 
and friendly concept or a practical application is characteristic of the American experience 
and our philosophy. Pragmatism, a belief in testing truth by clearly visible results and 
which understands "thought" as primarily a guide to action, is a respected philosophy which 
evolved in America and appears to express the American spirit and anlytical approach. Our 
foreign policy, our military strategy, and our economic life are often justified on the 
basis of pragmatism. When we make appeals to "the reasonable thing to do," it is most often 
the pragmatic philosophy that provides us with the standard of validity with which to define 
the reasonable. 
Pragmatism, however, tends to distort any understanding of a deterministic philosophy 
such as Marxism-Leninism. For example, the pragmatist might expect that once a Marxist has 
seen how efficiently our agricultural system operates, he will return to the Soviet Union 
and recommend decollectivization. The philosophical bias recognizes only that an ideology 
which does not produce practical results should reasonably be discarded. Such reasoning 
was massively publicized during the Khrushchev visit to the United States. 
The pragmatist, then, would be likely to overrate the force of facts in Soviet decisions. 
The Soviets, on the other hand, would be likely to exaggerate the force of America's economic 
drive (a desire to dominate world markets, for example) as the motive force in its foreign 
policy. 
There is even a different perception of time operating which may suggest to one side that 
there is a crisis when the other side does not think so. For the Marxist, as for the 
Slavophile before him, history has decreed the ultimate triumph. History has not given 
assurances that the path will be smooth with one inevitable success following another. 
Immediate results are neither expected nor required. Errors can be absorbed. The Cuban 
missile crisis, the expulsion from Egypt, and similar events are only illustrations of 
Lenin's phrase "two steps forward and one back." The timetable for the spread of communism 
is flexible to the extreme. 
The pragmatist, however, is in a hurry for results and intellectually embarrased by 
failure. Time does not guarantee him a remission of sins. In order to know the truth, he 
must test it through action, translate a plan into practice, and demonstrate its positive 
value. His tendency, because of the pressure of time and the need to act, to test this data, 
is to arrive at hasty conclusions. From the Soviet point of view, he overreacts, manufac-
tures crises where none exist. 
Our time sense is certainly exacerbated by our rhythm of life. In our careers, time is 
ney. Military personnel are geared to 2- or 3-year tours, and an aggressive, ambitious 
officer must make his mark quickly if he is interested in speedy promotion. The politician 
operates within a 4-year time frame, and the necessity of concrete results pressures the 
whole gamut of government employees working in foreign or domestic policy. There is a sense 
of impatience and urgency about problem solving which a Soviet officer probably does not 
share. 
These cultural and, in our case, pragmatic and practical misconceptions color military 
decisions at every level. In naval analysis it is argued that the Soviets decided to build 
certain ships during specific years on the basis of our practical experience; because Soviet 
ships are sailing the world's oceans, it is argued that they have adopred our naval strategy 
of control of the seas as though they had just discovered Mahan, it is asserted that the 
Cuban missile crisis taught the Soviets the value of seapower, although Soviets, and before 
them Czarist Russians, had been writing and theorizing about it for decades. 
It is difficult to comprehend the ability of preconceptions to obscure facts, even when 
they are striking. One example is the Styx missile. First appearing in 1959, it revolution-
ized naval tactics. Heretofore navies were rated on the basis of the number of bottoms and 
the size of ships. With the advent of the surface-to-surface missile, a small, fast boat 
could carry more firepower than a cruiser. The whole concept of naval tactics should have 
been changed. And yet, it was not until 1967, when a Styx sank the Israeli destroyer EILAT, 
that this new development began to be taken with the seriousness it deserved. Perhaps this 
1s because the pragmatist, concentrating on current problems and practical results, has 
.. . . • .1 .,. 
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difficulty shifting his attention to a general principle. Patterns that succeeded are 
repeated, and concentration is attracted to ever more detailed improvmeents. In the case of 
the Styx, since the immediate threat could be overcome by an F-4 launched from an aircraft 
carrier, the overall implications for naval warfare were, for a very long time, ignored. 
On the other hand, the Soviet officer, protected by the movement of history, tends to 
see the world and foreign cultures as striving for uniformity. Details of national 
differences are blurred. Egyptian pride and Moslem religious fervor are difficult to 
understand in the light of the promised victory of the proletariat. 
The danger is that the American, concerned with minute improvements in the operation of 
the carrier task force, will not notice that the Soviets have resolved the whole issue of 
the aircraft carrier. On the other hand, the Soviet officer, satisfied with the overall 
solution to a specific problem, will tend not to think of the variations in behavior which 
might temporarily obstruct that solution. 
In order to test truths and examine practical results, the pragmatist tends to be bound 
by artificial categories which he has established for experimental purposes. The navy fights 
its wars without reference to the army or air force; sea lines of communication begin to take 
on distinct mental outlines as if they existed as permanent highways through the water; and 
ingenious improvements will be proposed in the operations orders for the resupply of NATO by 
sea although the total concept may no longer be valid. 
The Soviet officer, in makin~_decisions. will assume the overriding nature of ideological 
interest which insures the cooperation and support of other branches of the armed forces. 
Of course, there will be interservice jealousies and rivalries, but he would not think of 
planning a major strategy without reference to the participation of all elements of the 
military, the government, and the party. Since the dynamics of history are moved by 
universal laws, military, economic, political, diplomatic, and cultural action all merge 
into one another and are, at once, an expression and means of realizing the same end. As 
distinctions between civil, political and private society fade, so do distinctions between 
national and class interests. 
The man of action is, almost by definition, easily conditioned. Since he finds fulfill-
ment in acting and in achieving demonstrable results, he cannot resist responding to a 
stimulus. He is attracted by patterns and not ideologies. Annual Soviet naval exercises 
are contrasted and compared only with previous ones. Warsaw Pact exercises are minutely 
annotated. At first a new development may be watched cautiously, even reacted to, but once 
sufficiently repeated, such developments are accepted as normal. Missile submarines in 
Cuba, intelligence collectors off Norfolk, multiple ship declarations for Bosporus transits 
all, once accepted, fail to cause alarm. 
A knowledge of this reaction-the inability of man to keep constantly on the alert-is 
useful for military cover and deception. Conditioning, which gives on side the added 
benefit of training, also softens the oppostion for the real thrust. Conditioning can 
proceed on another level as well. By interpreting every action as a manifestation of a 
reasonable and practical need judged by one's own standards-one loses all hope of accurately 
estimating the action of another, since the projection is merely one's own culture, one's 
self. 
If it seems absurd that a modern nation could pursue an "irrational" policy of that a 
whole people could support "irrational" action, one only needs a short review of recent 
history. The Nazi madness or the Soviet purges of the thirties when the Soviet equivalent 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was solemnly reported to have been agents of Japan, England, or 
Czechoslovakia provides enough evidence to sober the most skeptical. Indeed, the Soviet 
preparation for World War II consisted of liquidating a majority of the military, government, 
and industrial leaders and then launching an attack on Finland. 
The question remains: Who will shoot first and at what point? The question is far fr~ I 
answered, and the methodology for finding that answer is not even suggested. What this paper 
has tried to show is that the qualitative change in modern warfare has necessitated an 
overwhelming_ requirement to examine and improve the estimative process. We have been 
warned twice that we could be surprised. We have become accustomed to situations in which 
one or the other power might feel morally obliged to fire. The point at which that decision 
is made will be intuitive, culturally determined, and made to the roll of a different drum." 
(Edited from Capt. Bathurst's article in the January-February issue of the NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 
~VIEW. He currently occupies the Edwin T. Layton Military Chair of Intelligence at the 
Na~al War College.) 
SERVICE NOTE: FLIGHT PAY PLAN: "Defense officials will submit this week their proposal on 
continuing flight pay for pilots in all services. It sets up incremental periods called gates 
at which pilots would have to report the amount of operational flight time each has logged. 
The first gate would occur at 12 years service and if he has at least 6 years in a flying job, 
he will continue on flight pay even if then serving in a non-flying job. The next gate would 
be at 18 years service and 9 years of that time would have to be flight billets for him to 
qualify to continue drawing the pay. Other gates occur up to the 25th year of service. The 
services have been losing pilots since earlier legislation killed the flight pay for COL's 
and CAPT's and higher ranks when serving in non-flying assignments . " 
(AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, January 7, 1974) 
